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1.  Introduction 
U.S. fuel ethanol production has skyrocketed in recent years, going from 1.65 billion gallons in 2000 to 9 
billion gallons in 2008 (RFA 2009). The United States are now the largest world producer of ethanol, 
with one third more output than Brazil (an early large developer and user of ethanol as transportation 
fuel) and twelve times as much output as the next largest region (the European Union). It is apparent 
that this dramatic expansion of ethanol production owes much to critical support policies implemented 
by the United States. Specifically, US ethanol production currently benefits from a $0.45/gallon subsidy 
and a $0.54 duty on ethanol imports.1 In addition, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 established a 
renewable fuel standard that mandated specific targets for renewal fuel use. Such quantitative 
“mandates” have been expanded considerably by the Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA) of 
2007 which established that the annual use of renewable fuel should reach 36 billion gallons by 2022. 
The larger proportion of this target is to be accounted for by advanced biofuels (mostly cellulosic 
ethanol) the technological feasibility of which is still being debated. As of now, U.S. biofuels production 
is virtually all made up of corn-based ethanol, the production of which is mandated by EISA to increase 
to 15 billion gallons by 2015 (Yacobucci, 2008).  
 U.S. biofuels policies are rationalized in terms of the pursuit of a number of objectives. First, 
there is a continuing and deepening interest in developing alternative, greener and more secure energy 
sources. Environmental motivations are rooted in the worldwide concern about global climate change, 
and the role played by greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions that are produced with most energy 
consumption. The dependence of the United States on foreign oil is also relevant for both economic 
and political reasons. The petroleum share of US energy consumption is 40 percent, whereas domestic 
oil only contributes 15 percent to national energy production. Indeed, because this country accounts for 
nearly 25 percent of world petroleum consumption (Council of Economic Advisers, 2008), its choices 
are bound to have an appreciable effect on energy prices.  Following last year’s rise in fossil fuel prices, it 
is clear that the level and fluctuations in such prices can have a sizeable impact on US welfare. 
Compounding that, national security considerations arise when a large proportion of a basic commodity 
that is indispensable for US economic and military security, such as oil, comes from a volatile part of the 
world.  
                                               
1 The subsidy, which amounted to $0.51/gallon up to January 2009, is technically an excise tax credit 
available to operators that blend ethanol with gasoline. The import duty represents a secondary tariff, 
which adds to the normal 2.5 percent ad valorem tariff, and it is meant to prevent foreign ethanol 
production from being supported by the U.S. excise tax credit. 
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The hope is that bio-renewable fuels might alleviate the environmental impact of energy 
consumption and decrease the dependence of the United States on foreign energy sources. Furthermore, 
increasing biofuels production has the added implication of increasing the demand for agricultural 
production and thus is consistent with a long-standing commitment to support the farm sector in the 
United States and other developed countries.  
Whereas the pursuit of such ambitious objectives clearly provides scope for government 
intervention in this area, existing policies are controversial. The massive use of corn for ethanol 
production (more than one third of the US corn output is estimated to be used in ethanol production in 
the 2008-09 crop year) is putting considerable demand pressure on land, contributing to rising prices for 
grains and other products. This development has the potential to bring considerable benefits to 
agricultural producers, especially in the Midwest. But rising food prices have led to widespread concerns 
about the economic impacts of biofuels policies in the wider context, in particular reigniting the earlier 
“fuel versus food” debate (Ford Runge and Senauer, 2007). Much work has been devoted to study some 
of the economic impacts of biofuels, including an emphasis on projecting the short term and long term 
impacts on prices, production decisions and trade flows using multimarket models (Elobeid and 
Tokgoz, 2008) or computable general equilibrium models (Hertel, Tyner and Birur 2008). These and 
other studies (Rajagopal and Zilberman, 2007, provide an interpretative review) have made considerable 
strides in documenting some current and expected market impacts of the ongoing biofuels 
development.  
One of the motivations for promoting biofuels is the hope that they might provide a cleaner 
source of transportation fuel. On an energy equivalent basis, ethanol typically produces lower GHG 
emissions relative to gasoline, although this attribute is sensitive to the energy used to fire ethanol 
refineries (Wang, Wu and Huo, 2007). A necessary condition for a net positive environmental impact is 
that biofuels production, viewed from the perspective of life cycle analysis, yields more energy than the 
fossil energy used in its production, a fact that has been disputed by some for corn ethanol, but which 
seems now generally accepted (Shapouri, Duffield and Wang, 2002; Farrell et al., 2008). But concerns 
have recently focused on “indirect land use” effects: the notion that diverting corn to ethanol 
production in the United States might bring new marginal land into production elsewhere because of the 
increased overall demand for agricultural output (Searchinger et al. 2008). The computed indirect land 
use effects of planned biofuels mandates could be quite sizeable (Hertel, Tyner and Birur, 2008).  
Insofar as the documented and potential market impacts of biofuels production are traceable to 
the policies that are promoting their development, an interesting set of questions concerns the welfare 
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evaluation of these policies. For the case of the US ethanol subsidy, de Gorter and Just (2009a) have 
provided an initial concrete effort in this direction by analyzing how this tax credit interacts with existing 
price-contingent production subsidies. They emphasize the “rectangular” deadweight cost of subsidizing 
ethanol production in a setting where no such production activity would otherwise take place, and 
provide some numerical illustration that net welfare changes (defined as the sum of Marshallian 
surpluses measured in a partial equilibrium setting) are negative and large. de Gorter and Just (2009b) 
extend the inquiry by specifically looking at the effects of the ethanol mandate, as envisioned by the 
renewable fuel standard established by EISA, and provide some interesting analysis of the interaction of 
the ethanol mandate and subsidy.2 
What appears lacking in existing work is a perspective that casts welfare analysis in a normative 
context that explicitly accounts for the market failures that are held to play a critical role in this setting. 
As discussed earlier, one of the arguments in favor of biofuels is the hope that they might alleviate the 
environmental impact of energy consumption. The presumed market failure assumption should be 
explicitly built into the policy environment for the purpose of policy assessment. Holland, Hughes and 
Knittel (2009) do that by framing the problem as that of choosing a low carbon fuel standard, and 
provide some interesting analytical and numerical results. What they do not address explicitly is the 
national “energy security” argument that ascribes benefits to reducing US oil imports, ceteris paribus. In 
this paper we complement and generalize the analysis of existing studies by building a model that closely 
represents the structural elements of the U.S. ethanol industry and models the explicit policy tools that 
play a critical role in U.S. biofuels production. We address the international implications of the problem, 
including the U.S. dependence of oil imports, by casting the analysis in an open economy setting, and we 
provide both a positive and a normative evaluation of the main policy tools (taxes, subsidies and 
mandates).   
Specifically, in this paper we build a (simplified) general equilibrium structure of two trading 
countries, United States and rest-of-the-world (ROW), in which the agricultural and energy sectors are 
explicitly linked. The model is rooted in a competitive structure with upward sloping supply of corn, and 
where corn production can be used for food and feed, for ethanol production and for export. An 
explicit technology describes the conversion of corn to ethanol, and equilibrium entails free entry of new 
                                               
2 For example, the introduction of a tax credit (a production subsidy) in a setting where the mandate is 
binding leads to a decrease in the price of fuel (blend of gasoline and ethanol) and thus acts as a 
consumption subsidy (an outcome that is presumably at odds with the stated policy objective of 
reducing GHG emissions). 
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ethanol plants into the industry. Ethanol is blended with gasoline to satisfy domestic demand for 
transportation fuel arising from a representative household. The model distinguishes domestic and 
foreign components and explicitly captures the term-of-trade effects arising both in the oil market and 
in the grain market. Whereas such term-of-trade effects have the traditional interpretation of trade 
models, it is apparent that, for oil imports, they are also a vehicle for a coherent representation of the 
(security) benefits of reducing oil imports. The model also captures the consumption externalities (e.g., 
GHG emission from energy consumption) that affect household utility and thus impact welfare, and 
allows for a differential pollution effect for ethanol and unblended gasoline. 
The model structure permits the derivation of a number of interesting results. From a positive 
perspective, we characterize the market equilibrium effects of the policy tools that are used in the 
ethanol market, thereby complementing and extending the analysis of de Gorter and Just (2009b). A 
particularly useful result that we derive in this setting is to show that an ethanol quantity mandate is 
equivalent to a combination of an ethanol production subsidy and a fuel (gasoline) tax that are revenue 
neutral. The normative welfare analysis centers on characterizing “optimal” biofuels policies in the 
context of the specific second-best framework being studied. Again, we compare and contrast the 
alternative uses of ethanol subsidy and ethanol mandates, along with a fuel tax, and derive the optimal 
form of these policy instruments. A very interesting result that we derive concerns the comparison of a 
subsidy-only policy (a price instrument) and a mandate-only policy (a quantity instrument). We show 
that the (optimal) ethanol mandate yields higher welfare than the (optimal) ethanol subsidy. For reasons 
clarified in the derivation of this result, the equivalence between a price instrument and a quantity 
instrument that one typically expects in competitive models without uncertainty does not attain in our 
case. 
 
2.  The Model 
We construct a simplified general equilibrium structure that replicates the positive analysis of some 
existing studies, but that allows us to perform welfare analysis in a second-best setting.  The presence of 
an externality, the emission of greenhouse gases due to fuel consumption, together with the assumption 
that the country’s policies affect world prices of corn and oil provide the reasons why domestic 
government policy has the potential to increase domestic welfare.  However, restricting the set of policy 
instruments – ultimately to just biofuels policies – implies that the first-best outcome cannot be reached.  
The structure of our model allows us to perform second-best comparisons among these policy 
instruments. 
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2.1. Production 
We assume there is a fixed endowment of a numeraire good, which can be consumed or used in 
production.  There are two primary goods, corn and domestic oil, produced using the numeraire good 
and fixed resources (such as land, oil reserves, etc), and production of each exhibits increasing marginal 
cost.  The total (private) cost of producing the aggregate domestic corn quantity cX  is given by ( )cC X , 
from which the inverse supply function for corn is ′= ( )sc cp C X , and the private cost of producing the 
aggregate oil output oS  is Ω( )oS , implying the inverse supply function ′= Ω ( )
s
o op S , where ( , )s sc op p  
denote “supply” prices (received by domestic producers).  Oil is also supplied by foreign producers.  
The primary product corn can be consumed or can be, via a fixed-proportion technology described 
shortly, converted into ethanol, while the primary product oil can be converted, again via a fixed 
proportions technology, into gasoline.  The final product, fuel (energy) can be obtained through various 
blends of ethanol and gasoline.  
Given the assumption of a Leontief technology, the (long-run) production function for ethanol 
is written as { }= min ,ve c ex ax z , where ethanol vex  is here measured in volume units (gallons), cx  is the 
amount of corn used in ethanol production, a  is a production coefficient, and ez  is an index of all other 
inputs used per unit of ethanol production.3 By current estimates, one bushel of corn produces 
approximately 2.75 gallons of ethanol (Eidman, 2007), that is, ≅ 2.75a . But conversion of corn to 
ethanol also produces valuable byproducts, such as dried distiller’s grains with solubles (DDGS), which 
is a close substitute for corn as feed (Mathews and McConnell, 2009). To simplify, we assume that 
DDGS and corn are perfect substitutes in feed use. If a unit of corn produces δ1  units of byproduct, 
the price of which is proportional to that of corn, say δ2 cp , then that is equivalent to assuming that the 
production of ethanol requires fewer (net) units of corn, that is { }ρ= min ,ve c ex x z , where 
ρ δ δ= − 1 2(1 )a . Furthermore, we need to recognize that ethanol has a lower energy content than 
gasoline, so that the quantity of total “fuel” (gasoline and ethanol-blended gasoline) is written as 
                                               
3 The long-run interpretation of interest in this paper presumes free entry of new ethanol plants. The 
industry has indeed experienced a furious growth in this dimension, with the number of operating plants 
increasing from 54 in January 2000 to 170 in January 2009 (RFA 2009). 
 
 6 
γ≡ + vf g ex x x , where γ ≅ 0.7 .4 Thus, it is convenient to change the units of measurement, so that 
ethanol is measured in gasoline energy-equivalent units. To that end, define γ≡ ve ex x  and γ≡ e ez z . In 
these units, and accounting for the value of byproducts, ethanol production is written as  
 
(1) { }α= min ,e c ex x z  
 
where α γ δ δ≡ − 1 2(1 )a  and ez  is an index of all other inputs used in ethanol production, when the 
latter is measured in energy-equivalent units.   With that, the (constant returns to scale) cost function for 
ethanol production is ( )α +c e ep w x , where ew  denotes the price of all inputs other than corn 
(inclusive of the rental price of capacity).5  Thus, at given prices, the long-run supply price of ethanol is: 
 
(2)   
α
= +s ce e
p
p w  
 
Refining of oil into gasoline is assumed to also take place according to a fixed proportion 
technology, and so the production of unblended gasoline from oil is: 
 
(3)    { }β= min ,g o gx x z  
 
where ox  is the total quantity of oil refined, β  is the number of gallons of refined gasoline per barrel of 
crude oil and gz  denotes the aggregate of other inputs used in gasoline production. Hence, the 
(constant returns to scale) cost function for gasoline production is β +( )o g gp w x , where gw  is the price 
of gz  (inputs other than oil, including the rental price of capacity). Thus, the supply price of gasoline is: 
                                               
4 A gallon of pure ethanol contains 76,000 BTUs (British Thermal Units) of energy, whereas a gallon of 
gasoline contains 110,000 BTUs of energy (NREL 2008). 
 
5 In essence, we assume the price of these other inputs is constant in terms of the numeraire good.  This 
could happen if the other inputs were produced under constant returns using only the numeraire, or if 
there were fixed endowments of these other inputs and they were perfect substitutes, in utility, for the 
numeraire.   
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(4)   β= +
s o
g g
p
p w  
 
2.2. Demand 
We assume a domestic population of consumers who have quasi-linear preferences. The consumers’ 
utility depends upon three private goods: fuel (blend of gasoline and ethanol), corn, and a composite 
good that aggregates all other goods. The consumers’ utility is also negatively affected by the pollution 
associated with the (aggregate) consumption of energy. Such preferences can be exactly aggregated up to 
a single representative agent’s preference ordering. Furthermore, the quasilinear structure allows for an 
internally consistent welfare analysis (that is, independently of the distribution of income/endowments). 
The representative consumer’s utility is therefore written as  
 
(5) ( ) ( ) ( )φ θ σ λ= + + − +f c g eU y D D x x  
 
where y  represents the consumption of the composite commodity (the numeraire), 6 and the vector 
( , )f cD D  represents the consumption of fuel and corn. The standard assumption of quasiconcavity of 
the utility function in the choice variables, given the quasilinear structure, translates into the condition 
that φ ⋅( )  and θ ⋅( )  are concave functions. The last term in the utility function, through the function 
σ ⋅( ) , represents the environmental damages that come from aggregate fuel utilization.  Note that the 
parameter λ  permits the relative pollution efficiency of ethanol and gasoline to differ, where the two are 
measured in comparable energy units, so λ < 1  if and only if ethanol is less polluting than gasoline per 
energy unit.   
The US consumer demand for fuel (including gasoline blended with ethanol, with everything 
measured in gasoline energy equivalent units) is derived from maximizing the utility function in (5), 
taking as given the external effects of the function σ ⋅( ) , so that the inverse demand function is 
φ′= ( )f fp D  and the demand function is φ −′= 1( ) ( ) ( )f f fD p p . 
                                               
6 As noted in footnote 1, these many other goods in the utility function can be aggregated to a single 
index, denoted by y , provided all these other goods are perfect substitutes in consumption for the 
numeraire, or that their opportunity cost of production is constant in terms of the numeraire good. 
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 The domestic consumer demand for corn as food or feed is similarly obtained maximizing the 
utility function in (5), so that the inverse demand function is θ ′= ( )c cp D . Inverting this relation yields 
the domestic demand curve for direct corn consumption θ −′= 1( ) ( ) ( )c c cD p p .  
 
2.3. Foreign sector 
We assume there are three traded goods: corn, oil and the numeraire good. In the model, ethanol trade 
is precluded. The possibility of exporting U.S. ethanol is not interesting because it is widely believed that 
the U.S. corn-based technology is not as efficient as the Brazilian sugar-cane-based production. 
Neglecting imports of ethanol is justified by the existence of the $0.54/gallon import duty, which is 
effectively acting as a prohibitive tariff.7 As for the traded commodities, the model assumes that, under 
free trade, the United States imports oil and exports corn.8 Because in the welfare analysis of this paper 
we are only concerned with domestic welfare, we do not need to be explicit about the cost structure and 
preferences of the ROW.  Assuming that their economic policy is given, we only need to model the 
relevant behavioral functions (the ROW’s export supply of oil and import demand for corn). Here, and 
throughout the paper, we follow the convention by which the overstruck bar denotes foreign variables. 
The ROW’s import demand for corn is written as ( )c cD p , where cp  is the net price in the foreign 
market, and ′ < 0cD .  Similarly, we let ( )o oS p  denote the ROW’s export supply of oil to the United 
States, where ′ > 0oS .
9 
 
3.  Competitive Equilibrium 
Because we assume world oil and corn prices are endogenous, and because there is an externality due to 
pollution, in the model we are developing there are three sources for government intervention to 
                                               
7 A limited amount of ethanol is imported (about 0.6 billion gallons in 2008), mostly from countries that 
are part of the Caribbean Basin Initiative and thus enjoy a limited exemption from the secondary 
ethanol import tariff.  
 
8 It may either import or export the numeraire good.  Recall that, in the model, the world prices of corn 
and oil are the relative prices in terms of this numeraire good.   
 
9 In general, these behavioral equations could depend upon both relative prices, i.e., the ROW import 
demand for corn might also depend upon the price of oil.  To justify this specification, which simplifies 
the analysis but is not critical, we assume the production and preference structure is the same in the 
ROW as in the United States.  Naturally, the ROW’s import demand for corn is the demand for U.S. 
corn exports. 
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increase domestic welfare.  The endogenous export price for corn means that the United States can gain 
by restricting corn exports, which is the standard terms of trade (or monopoly power) argument for 
trade restrictions.  Similarly, the United States could gain from restricting oil imports for two possible 
reasons: (i) the standard terms of trade arguments, whereby restrictions on oil imports lower world oil 
prices, and (ii) U.S. national security may be undermined by oil imports, even if world prices are 
exogenous.  Finally, the government has an incentive to intervene due to the market failure of pollution.  
Hence:   
 
Remark 1.   Maximizing domestic welfare in this setting requires three policies: an export tax on corn; 
an import tax on oil; and a tax on pollution emissions.   
 
If these three policies were implemented, then there would be no welfare-increasing rationale for 
other policies, such as ethanol subsidies or mandates.  However, if some of these policies are not 
politically feasible, then the country – from the perspective of domestic welfare – is in a second-best 
situation and it is possible that policies which indirectly address these inefficiencies, such as ethanol 
mandates or subsidies, might improve domestic welfare even though these indirect policies will not be 
able to achieve the optimum solution.  
Because we wish to focus on ethanol policies in this paper, we initially assume that there are no 
other domestic taxes or subsidies in place. Furthermore, we know that international commitments 
through the WTO constrain border policies (as well as some domestic policies), at least in principle.10 
Thus, we assume: 
 
Assumption 1.   No border policies, such as import taxes on oil, or export taxes on corn, are feasible. 
Also, there are no domestic corn or oil taxes or subsidies. 
 
This assumption implies world prices equal domestic producer prices, and that domestic prices to buyers 
and sellers, in the corn and oil markets, are the same. Hence, this assumption implies = =so o op p p  and 
= =
s
c c cp p p , a condition that we will maintain throughout the analysis. 
 
                                               
10 A domestic consumption tax on oil, coupled with a production subsidy for domestic oil producers, 
would be equivalent to an import tariff on oil.  Hence, constraining border policies means an implicit 
constraint on domestic policy.   
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3.1. Corn and ethanol markets 
From the assumed cost structure of the agricultural sector, the market supply function of corn 
can be written as: −′= ≡1( ) ( ) ( )c c c cX C p S p .  There are three uses for domestic corn output: domestic 
consumption (by households),11 with demand ( )c cD p , exports, with demand ( )c cD p , and ethanol 
production. For any given amount of cx  devoted to ethanol production, equilibrium in the corn market 
must satisfy  
 
(6)  ( ) ( ) ( )= + +c c c c c c cS p D p D p x  
 
which means that the residual supply of corn to the ethanol sector is:   
 
(7) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )≡ − −c c c c c c cQ p S p D p D p  
 
Clearly, ′ >( ) 0cQ p . Also, using (2), we get the inverse ethanol supply curve: 
 
(8)    ( ) ( )α
α
= +c ese e e
p x
p x w  
 
where −⋅ ≡ ⋅1( ) ( )cp Q . Thus the derived inverse ethanol supply curve is upward sloping, 
α
−⎡ ⎤′= >⎣ ⎦
12 ( ) 0se e cdp dx Q p . 
 
3.2. Oil and gasoline markets 
The domestic supply function for oil is obtained by inverting the aggregate marginal production cost, 
yielding  −′≡ Ω 1( ) ( ) ( )o o oS p p , and the foreign supply of oil to the United States is written as ( )o oS p , 
where again we assume no tariffs or quotas on imported oil are feasible. The per unit production cost of 
unblended gasoline, which is the selling price of gasoline to refiners assuming perfect competition, can 
be written as: 
                                               
11 Obviously corn is not consumed directly by households but it is used as an input for food production. 
Assuming competition throughout, we can treat corn as a final consumption good without loss of 
generality. 
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(9)    ( )ββ⎛ ⎞+ = ⇔ = −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠o g g o g g
p
w p p p w  
 
Because gasoline production is directly proportional to total domestic use of oil, we can write unblended 
gasoline supply as a function of oil price, and therefore as a function of gasoline price: 
 
(10)  ( ) ( )β ψ= + ≡ −( ) ( )g o o o o g gx S p S p p w  
 
Thus, the derived supply of unblended gasoline to the US market is upward sloping:  
 
(11)    ψ β′ ′ ′⎡ ⎤= = + >⎣ ⎦2 ( ) ( ) 0g o o o o
g
dx
S p S p
dp
 
 
4.  Comparative Statics of Equilibrium 
Before analyzing the welfare implications of various policies, let us first consider the equilibrium 
conditions and the comparative statics of these polices.  We start by considering the effects of a fuel tax 
and ethanol subsidy.12 
 
4.1. Equilibrium with fuel taxes and ethanol subsidies 
For the purpose of characterizing market equilibrium we assume that ethanol, adjusted for energy 
content, is a perfect substitute for gasoline over the relevant range. Hence, equilibrium in the fuel 
market requires = +( )f f g eD p x x .  Alternatively, the relevant equilibrium conditions can be represented 
in terms of arbitrage conditions, using inverse demand and supply functions, that account for the policy 
instruments of  interest. For the latter, we wish to explicitly model the unit (blending) subsidy for 
ethanol, which we denote as b . Furthermore, it is important to consider the possibility of a fuel tax, a 
standard instrument typically invoked to address market failures in this setting (Parry and Small, 2005). 
                                               
12 Of the three policy instruments that might be considered here (ethanol subsidy, gasoline tax, and fuel 
tax), one is redundant. Specifically, a fuel tax of t and an ethanol subsidy of b  is fully equivalent to a 
gasoline tax of t and an ethanol subsidy of ( )−b t . 
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Hence, let t  denote the unit tax on fuel (gasoline and/or blend of gasoline and ethanol). Then the 
arbitrage relations implied by equilibrium in the energy market are: 
 
(12) 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
= + −
= + − +
s
g g f g e
s
e e f g e
p x p x x t
p x p x x t b
  
 
where ⋅( )fp  is the inverse demand for fuel ≡ +f g ex x x , ⋅( )
s
ep  is the inverse supply of ethanol, and 
⋅( )sgp  is the inverse supply of gasoline. Using ′∂ ∂ = 1f f fp x D , ψ ′∂ ∂ = 1g gp x , and 
α ′∂ ∂ = 21 ( )e ep x Q , the comparative static relations between tax, subsidy and quantities is given by: 
 
(13) ( )+⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤−= ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥
−
−⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
1 3 2 2 3
1 2 1 31 2 3
1 g
e
dt dxr r r r r
db dxr r r rr r r N
 
 
where ( )α ψ′ ′ ′≡ − + + >2 0fN D Q  and the terms ( )∈ 0,1ir  satisfy 
 
(14) α ψ
=
′− ′ ′
≡ = ≡ =∑2 31 2 3
1
, , , 1f i
i
D Qr r r r
N N N
 
 
Inverting yields:  
 
(15) ( ) ( )
−⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤
= − ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥+ −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
1 3 2 3
1 2 1 3 2
g
e
r r r rdx dt
N
r r r r rdx db
 
 
The impact of the fuel tax or the ethanol subsidy on the prices and quantities of gasoline, 
ethanol and fuel, as derived in equations (13) and (15), are summarized in Table 1. As expected, an 
ethanol subsidy raises ethanol production and price, decreases gasoline consumption and price, raises 
total fuel consumption and has an ambiguous impact on pollution, even if λ < 1 . A fuel tax decreases 
ethanol and gasoline consumption, and thus lowers total fuel consumption and pollution, regardless of 
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the value of λ .  Thus, both policies are potentially beneficial due to their impact on corn export prices 
and oil import prices, as well as their potential impact on pollution.  
 
4.2. Equilibrium with mandates 
A central element of the U.S. biofuels policy, expanded by EISA, concerns the use of quantitative 
“mandates” on the amount of biofuels production. Such mandates could be implemented in several 
different ways—as a mandated level of consumption or as a mandated proportion of total consumption.  
De Gorter and Just (2009b) and Holland, Hughes and Knittel (2009) consider policies that require a 
given proportion of fuel to be accounted for by the alternative fuel. Whereas it is true that the 
implementation of the ethanol mandate by the Environmental Protection Agency relies on mandating a 
blending standard for obligated parties, enforced through a system of renewable identification numbers, 
it is also true that the chosen standard is selected to meet the specific overall quantitative target set by 
EISA (given an expected total consumption level). In this paper, therefore, we model mandates as 
specifying a minimum level of consumption.  Obviously, in a competitive deterministic setting the 
mandates will have no effect if they do not bind. 
 
4.2.1. Quantity mandates with ethanol subsidy 
Because a binding mandate means that blenders, who sell fuel, must use more ethanol than would 
otherwise be profitable, one cannot use an arbitrage condition for relating ethanol, gasoline and fuel 
prices.  Rather, the equilibrating condition that we use in this model is a zero profit condition for the 
fuel industry.  Letting Mex  represent the exogenous ethanol mandate, and b  the ethanol subsidy (if any), 
the zero profit condition is: 
 
(16)   ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )+ ⋅ + − ⋅ − − ⋅ = 0M M M Mf g e g e g g g e e ep x x x x p x x p x b x  
 
where Mex  is exogenous and − ≥ + ≥( ) ( ) ( )
M M
e e f g e g gp x b p x x p x  (with strict inequality if the mandate 
binds).  With a binding mandate, the price of ethanol is strictly determined by the mandate.  Given that 
fuel prices are demand-determined and ethanol prices are supply-determined, then (16) determines 
( , )Mg ex x b .  Finally, (16) also shows that in equilibrium the fuel price must be a weighted average of the 
price of gasoline and ethanol. 
 14 
As is well known, unambiguous comparative statics results in a setting such as ours ultimately 
rely on stability conditions. The equilibrium condition in the energy market can be written in terms of 
the excess demand function as: 
 
(17)   ( ) ( ) ( )≡ − − = 0Mg f f g g eJ p D p x p x  
 
Hence, Walrasian stability requires ψ′ ′= ⋅ − <( ) 0g f f gdJ dp D dp dp . Assuming that demand and supply 
curves have their conventional slopes ψ ′ ′> >( 0 )fD , and using (16), the stability condition can be 
rewritten as: 
 
(18)   
ψ ′ ′⎛ ⎞− ⎡ ⎤= − <⎜ ⎟ ⎣ ⎦⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
0f f g
g f
DdJ MR MC
dp x
 
 
where fMR  denotes the marginal revenue associated with an increase in fuel sales, i.e., 
≡ + ⋅( )f f f f fMR p x dp dx , and gMC  denotes the increase in expenditures on gasoline due to an 
increase in gasoline sales, i.e.,  ≡ + ⋅( )g g g g gMC p x dp dx .   Define eMC  as the increase in expenditures 
on ethanol due to an increase in ethanol sales, i.e., ≡ + ⋅( )e e e e eMC p x dp dx .  Differentiating (16) yields: 
 
(19)   ( ) ( )− = − − −M Mf g g e f e eMR MC dx MC MR b dx x db  
 
Using the foregoing definitions and (14), the marginal effects in (19) satisfy = − 1( )f f fMR p x r N , 
= + 3( )g g gMC p x r N  and = + 2( )Me e eMC p x r N . Equation (19) can then be re-written as: 
 
(20) ( ) ( )⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤+ +⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥− − − = + + − − −⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦1 3 1 2
M M Mg e g g e M Me
f g g e f e e
x x x x x xp p dx p b p dx x db
r N r N r N r N
 
 
The condition for (Walrasian) stability of the fuel market in (18), in the presence of the ethanol mandate, 
requires the expression in brackets on the left-hand-side of (20) to be negative. When the mandate is 
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binding and = 0Medx , then from (20) it is immediate, as discussed in DeGorter and Just (2009b), to 
conclude that: 
 
Lemma 1.   Given a binding quantity ethanol mandate, an ethanol subsidy sufficiently small so that the 
mandate still binds leads to increased gasoline, and fuel, usage, higher oil prices and lower fuel prices, 
but does not affect ethanol prices. 
 
4.2.2. Quantity mandates: A re-interpretation 
Next, consider the relationship between only mandates (with = 0b ) and the simultaneous use of a fuel 
tax and ethanol subsidy such that net tax revenue is constant (and equal to zero).  From =f etx bx  it 
follows that: 
 
(21)   ( )= − +f e f ex dt bdx tdx x db  
 
Using (21) in conjunction with (13) yields:  
 
(22) = −g eHdx Kdx  
 
where  
(23) 
( )
+⎧ ⎫
≡ + − >⎨ ⎬⎩ ⎭
+⎧ ⎫
≡ + + − >⎨ ⎬⎩ ⎭
1 3
1 2
0
0
g e g
g e e
x x x
H tN
r r
x x xK b t N
r r
 
 
Note that > 0H  follows directly from the stability condition invoked earlier, whereas > 0K  holds 
because we must have ≥b t  for the mandate to bind. The case of a pure (binding) mandate is given by 
(20) with = 0b  and = 0db . Noting that, by definition, − =( )f gp p t  and ( )− = −( )e fp p b t , then it is 
apparent that (22) is equivalent to (20). We conclude with the following result, which will prove quite 
useful for the welfare analysis that follows. 
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PROPOSITION 1.   An ethanol mandate is equivalent to a combination of an ethanol blending subsidy 
and a fuel tax that are revenue neutral.   
 
Using (13) and (22), the changes in the subsidy and tax required to support the increased ethanol 
mandate (subject to the balanced budget constraint) are:   
 
(24) 
( ) ( )
( )
2 1 3 2 3
1 2 3
1 2 1 3
1 2 3
e
M
e
f
M
e
x r r r N b t r r tNdt
r r r NHdx
x r r b t N r r tNdb
r r r NHdx
+ + − +
=
+ − −
=
 
 
Around the laissez faire equilibrium ( )= = 0t b , increasing the mandate is equivalent to raising both the 
ethanol subsidy and fuel tax, in a revenue neutral fashion.  Further, note that around the laissez-faire 
equilibrium, >M Me edb dx dt dx , implying that the net subsidy to ethanol ( )−b t  also increases.   
However, for sufficiently large mandates, further increases in the mandate may correspond to reduced 
ethanol subsidies and, even more plausibly, reduced net ethanol subsidies.  Nevertheless, an increased 
mandate must yield a higher ethanol price for suppliers. Although we normally expect that increasing the 
mandate raises the blended fuel prices, and thus reduces total consumption, it turns out that the 
comparative statics effect on total fuel consumption (and fuel price) is actually indeterminate: 
 
(25)   
( ) ( ) ( )+ − −
−⎛ ⎞
= =⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
3 2
M M
g e g e
M
e
d x x x r x r bNH K
H Hdx
 
 
Evaluating (25) at the point where the mandate just binds ( )= = ⇒ = =0 g e ft b p p p , the numerator can 
be written as: 
 
(26) ( ) ( ) ε ε
ε ε
⎧ ⎫−⎪ ⎪
− = ⎨ ⎬⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭3 2
e gM
g e g
g e
x r x r Np  
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where: ε ≡ ( )( )g g g g gdx dp p x  and ε ≡ ( )( )e e e e edx dp p x are the elasticities of derived supply of 
gasoline and ethanol, respectively. Hence, it follows that, as noted by de Gorter and Just (2008):13 
 
Lemma 2.   If the supply of ethanol is more elastic than the supply of gasoline (oil), then over some 
domain an ethanol mandate raises total fuel consumption and lowers the price of fuel. 
 
This latter result implies that, even without taking into account the impact of U.S. mandates on 
pollution generated in the rest of the world, the ethanol mandate could raise domestically generated 
pollution even if λ < 1 .  
 
5. Welfare Implications of Policy 
The utility function in (5) gives welfare under quasi-linear preferences as a function of consumption of 
the numeraire, of corn and of fuel, taking into account the impact of the externality.  Domestic 
consumption of the numeraire is endowment less resources used up in production, plus net exports, all 
measured in numeraire units.  Hence: 
 
(27) 
( ) ( ){ }
( ) ( ) ( )φ θ σ λ
⎡ ⎤= − + + − Ω − − + −⎣ ⎦
+ + + − +
c c c o e e g g c c o o
g e c g e
W I C D D x S w x w x p D p S
x x D x x
 
 
In this equation, I  is the aggregate endowment of the numeraire, + +( )c c cC D D x  is the cost of 
domestic corn production, Ω( )oS  is the cost of domestic oil production, ( )e ew x  and ( )g gw x  are the 
costs of other inputs used in ethanol and gasoline production, all measured in numeraire units.  Finally, 
the term −[ ]c c o op D p S  represents net exports, and hence represents imports of the numeraire (under 
balanced trade).  Note that if there is no international trade, then prices do not directly affect domestic 
welfare – it is the impact prices have on resource allocation that affects welfare.  With international 
                                               
13 The results in Lemma 2 differ somewhat from those articulated in de Gorter and Just (2009b) because 
the latter models mandates as a (percent) fuel standard. Whereas such comparative statics results are 
obviously sensitive to the way the mandate is modeled, it should be clear that the welfare effects 
discussed in the next section remain robust to that specification choice (because the welfare effects 
ultimately depend on the overall production of gasoline and ethanol supported by the policy).  
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trade, prices affect domestic welfare because price changes redistribute wealth between domestic and 
foreign agents.  
We seek to characterize conditions under which welfare is maximized, i.e., = 0dW . Taking the 
total differential of (27) yields: 
 
(28)  
( ) ( )
( )
φ θ
σ λ
′ ′ ′ ′= ⋅ + + ⋅ − ⋅ + + −Ω ⋅
′− − + + − − − ⋅ +
g e c c c c o
e e g g c c c c o o o o g e
dW dx dx dD C dD dD dx dS
w dx w dx p dD D dp p dS S dp dx dx
 
 
Under Assumption 1 (no direct intervention in the corn or oil markets and no border tariffs), the 
marginal production cost for domestic corn and the marginal utility of domestic corn consumption are 
both equal to the price of corn, that is θ ′ ′= =cp C , and the marginal cost of domestic oil production 
equals its price, that is ′Ω = op . Also, the marginal utility of domestic fuel consumption is equal to the 
retail price of fuel, that is φ′ + =( )g e fx x p . Using these conditions, grouping terms, and using the fact 
that the assumed production structure implies ( )β= ⋅ +g o odx dS dS  and α= ⋅e cdx dx , we obtain: 
 
(29) σ λσβ α
⎧ ⎫ ⎧ ⎫
′ ′= − − − + − − − + −⎨ ⎬ ⎨ ⎬⎩ ⎭⎩ ⎭
o c
f g g f e e c c o o
p p
dW p w dx p w dx D dp S dp  
 
From the zero profit condition for refining and ethanol production (rents are transferred to the corn 
market), the prices received by the sellers of gasoline and the sellers of ethanol are: 
 
(30)  β
α
= +
= +
s o
g g
s c
e e
p
p w
p
p w
 
 
So that (29) becomes: 
 
(31) { } { }σ λσ′ ′= − − + − − + −s sf g g f e e c c o odW p p dx p p dx D dp S dp  
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Note that with no externalities ( )σ ′ = 0  and no taxes/subsidies (i.e., = =s sf g ep p p ), the only welfare 
effects are the terms-of-trade effects.  Define the “effective” tax on fuel and “effective” subsidy to 
ethanol by:14 
 
(32)  ( )
≡ −
≡ − −
s
f g
s
e f
t p p
b p p t
   
 
so that (31) can be rewritten as 
 
(33)   { } { }σ λσ′ ′= − − − + + −g e c c o odW t dx b t dx D dp S dp  
 
Recall that, with no domestic or border policies in the corn or oil market, corn prices are in 1-1 
correspondence with ethanol output and oil supplies are in 1-1 correspondence with the price of oil. 
Hence, we can write ethanol supply as a function of corn prices as α= ( )e cx Q p , where ( )cQ p  is the 
supply of corn to the ethanol industry in equation (7). From this we obtain α ′=e cdx Q dp , implying 
 
(34) 
α
=
′
e
c
dxdp
Q
 
 
Similarly, gasoline production is directly proportional to total domestic use of oil, so that we can write 
unblended gasoline supply as a function of oil price, and therefore as a function of gasoline price, as in 
equation (10). From (10) we obtain ψ ′=g gdx dp , and from ( ) β= −o g gp p w  we get β=o gdp dp . So 
 
(35) 
β
ψ
=
′
g
o
dx
dp  
 
Substitute (34) and (35) into (33) to obtain:   
 
                                               
14 Given the tax is on fuel, the net subsidy to ethanol is, of course, ( )−b t . 
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(36)  βσ λσ
ψ α
⎧ ⎫ ⎧ ⎫
′ ′= − − − − + −⎨ ⎬ ⎨ ⎬
′ ′⎩ ⎭⎩ ⎭
o c
g e
S DdW t dx b t dx
Q
 
 
For future reference, define: 
 
(37) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )( )( )
β
σ λ
ψ
∂
′≡ = + − − + −
∂ ′
o o g
g f g e g g g e
g g g
S p xWW p x x p x x x
x p x
 
(38)  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )( )( )λσ λ α
∂
′≡ = + − − + +
′∂
c c e
e f g e e e g e
e c e
D p xWW p x x p x x x
x Q p x
 
 
Consider the second (partial) derivatives in the variables gx  and  ex : 
 
(39)   
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
( )
( )
ψ ψ ψ
σ
ψ ψ
λ σ
α α
λσ
⎧ ⎫′ ′ ′ ′ ′′+ − +⎪ ⎪
′′= − − − ⎨ ⎬
′ ′ ′⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
⎧ ⎫′ ′ ′′−⎪ ⎪
′′= − − + ⎨ ⎬
′ ′ ′⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
′′= = −
′
2
3
2
2 32
1 1
1 1
1
gg
f
c c
ee
f
eg ge
f
S S S S S S
W
D
D Q D QW
D Q Q
W W
D
 
 
Assumption 2.   The function ( , )g eW x x  is concave in its arguments  and the variables gx  and ex  are 
substitutes, i.e.,  < 0egW . 
 
The functional conditions that must obtain for < <0, 0ee egW W  are standard curvature conditions, but 
the condition for ggW  is more complicated because it depends on the relationship between the domestic 
and foreign oil supply curve. Still, the assumption on ggW  is not unreasonable.15 
                                               
15  For example, suppose that ( ) ( )κ=o oS p S p  for some positive scalar κ .  Then sufficient conditions 
for Assumption 2 to hold are:  σ ′′ ′′≥ ≥0, 0Q  and ( )ψ ⋅  is logconcave. 
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We are interested in drawing the contours = 0gW  and = 0eW  in ( , )g ex x  space.  The concavity 
and substitute conditions from Assumption 2 guarantee that 
=
= − <
0
0
e
g e ee egW
dx dx W W  and 
=
= − <
0
0
g
g e eg ggW
dx dx W W . These conditions, in conjunction with the determinant condition for 
concavity, imply that the contour for = 0eW  has a steeper slope g edx dx  than that for = 0gW , 
yielding the shapes illustrated in Figure 1.  
The optimal solution in Figure 1 is still a second best solution, as discussed earlier. To achieve 
this (second best) optimum, we need two (independent) policy instruments – ethanol subsidies and fuel 
taxes (or equivalently, as noted earlier, ethanol subsidies and unblended gasoline taxes). An alternative 
mix that would (may) allow the solution to be achieved would be binding ethanol mandates and fuel 
taxes. 
We discuss first the case when the policy instruments are ethanol subsidies and taxes on fuel.  
From (13) and (15) choosing ( , )g ex x  is equivalent to choosing ( , )t b . Because = 0dW  at this second-
best solution, then from (36) these policies are characterized as follows. 
 
PROPOSITION 2.   Assuming the only feasible policies are domestic subsidies to ethanol producers and a 
tax on all fuel consumption, the optimal policy is given by: 
(40) 
β
σ
ψ
′= + >
′
* 0o
S
t  and ( ) βλ σ
α ψ
′= + − +
′ ′
* 1c o
D S
b
Q
. 
 
Note that both *t  and *b  will be positive, provided λ ≤ 1 .  As discussed earlier, the reasons for 
intervention are the externality and the impact of domestic policy on our import/export prices.16  In the 
case of the fuel tax, the reasons reinforce each other, and hence the tax is unambiguously positive; the 
same is true for the gross subsidy to ethanol *b .  In this setting, of course, interest should center on the 
net subsidy to ethanol, defined as ≡ −* *bˆ b t . It turns out that this can be of either sign.   
 
Lemma 3.   If the tax t  applies only to gasoline, so that the ethanol subsidy represents a net subsidy, 
the optimal policy is: 
                                               
16 Similar results for the fuel tax would hold if the world price of fuel were exogenous but, for political 
economy reasons, domestic welfare was a decreasing function of oil imports.   
 22 
  βσ
ψ
′= + >
′
* 0o
S
t   and  λσ
α
′= −
′
ˆ cDb
Q
. 
 
Thus, the net subsidy to ethanol is potentially ambiguous – increasing the net ethanol subsidy is 
beneficial, due to the terms of trade effect in the corn market, but detrimental due to the pollution effect 
( )λ > 0 .  For a closed economy setting, as in de Goerter and Just (2009b) and Holland, Hughes and 
Knittel (2009), only the carbon externality motive remains, and in such a case one would obtain σ ′=*t  
and λσ ′= −bˆ , implying that both gasoline and ethanol ought to be taxed. 
Returning to the use of fuel taxes and ethanol subsidies, the optimal policy in the presence of 
terms-of-trade effects is usually expressed in elasticity terms.  Doing so yields: 
 
(41) σ
ε
′= +*
g
o
g
p
t m  
(42) 
( )( ) ( )λ σ
ε ε
−
′= + + −* 1ge e c o
c g
pp w D Q
b m  
(43) 
( ) ( ) λσ
ε
−
′
− = −
* * e e c
c
p w D Q
b t  
 
where: ≡ +( )o o o om S S S  is the import share of domestic oil consumption, εg  is the elasticity of the 
derived supply of unblended gasoline (from oil), defined earlier, and ε ≡ ( )( )c c cdQ dp p Q  is the 
elasticity of the residual supply of corn to the ethanol industry (hence this elasticity is larger than any of 
the demand or supply elasticities individually).   
 
Lemma 4.  The optimal tax on ethanol is increasing in the share of oil imported, and decreasing in the 
elasticity of aggregate oil supply.  The optimal (net) subsidy to ethanol is increasing in the ratio of corn 
exports to corn use in ethanol, and decreasing in the elasticity of the residual supply curve. 
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Note that if only one policy instrument (such as an ethanol subsidy or ethanol mandate) is used, then in 
general the second best optimum pictured in Figure 1 cannot be reached.17  We now turn to a welfare 
comparison of these two instruments. 
 
5.1. Welfare when ethanol subsidies are the only policy instrument 
As shown earlier, ethanol subsidies affect both gasoline using and ethanol usage.  Substituting (15) in to 
(36) yields: 
 
(44)  ( ) ( )( )⎡ ⎤= − + + + −⎣ ⎦1 3 2 3 1 3 2 1 2g edW N W r r dt r r db W r r r db r r dt  
 
Assuming only ethanol subsidies are used (or the tax rate is exogenously given) then = 0dt  and: 
 
(45)   ( ){ } ( ) { }η∂ = + − = + +∂ 1 3 2 2 3 1 3 2e g e gW N W r r r W r r N r r r W Wb  
 
where ( )η ∈ −0, 1  is the slope, g edx dx , in gasoline-ethanol space, of the one dimensional locus 
generated by changing the subsidy while holding the tax rate constant, that is: 
 
(46) 
( )
( )
ψη
ψ
∂ ∂ ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ′− −
≡ = = ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟′ ′∂ ∂ + −⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
3
1 3
g
e f
x b r
x b r r D
. 
 
Equation (45) shows the subsidy affects welfare through its impact on both ethanol and gasoline use.  If 
we have only one policy instrument, we are restricted – in terms of Figure 1 – to move along a one-
dimensional subset of the two-dimensional space, and the term η  represents the slope of this feasible 
locus (see dotted line in Figure 1, where 0x  represents the laissez faire point).  
The optimal ethanol subsidy must solve ∂ ∂ = 0W b  and thus, from (45), η+ = 0e gW W . Using 
prior definitions, with an exogenous tax t  this requires: 
 
                                               
17 A singular exception would be if gasoline taxes could be used and the optimal net ethanol subsidy 
were zero.  Clearly, this is a zero probability event.  Note that, if fuel taxes are the only policy 
instrument, then this second best solution can never be supported.   
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(47)   ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) βψλσ σ
α ψ ψ
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ′−⎜ ⎟′ ′
− + + − + + − − − =⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟′ ′ ′ ′−⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
0c of e g e e f e g g g
f
D S
p x x p x p x x p x
Q D
 
 
The solution to the constrained welfare optimum, denoted ( ) ( ), ( )e gx t x t , is found using equation (47) 
and the arbitrage equation: 
 
(48) ( ) ( )+ − − = 0f e g g gp x x p x t  
 
Note that, for = 0t , < 0gW ; since η < 0 , the solution must therefore occur somewhere in the domain 
where < 0gW  and < 0eW . That is, the subsidy is such that ethanol is “overproduced” ( )< 0eW , given 
the availability of gasoline, because the ethanol subsidy indirectly reduces the use of gasoline.  In fact, it 
is apparent that this property is true for all > 0t  such that σ β ψ′ ′< + ot S .18  Finally, the optimal subsidy 
is given, definitionally, by  ( ) ( ) ( )= − + +   e e f g eb t p x p x x t . Given the above, the welfare effects when the 
ethanol subsidy is the only policy instrument can be summarized as follows: 
 
PROPOSITION 3.  Suppose the only policy instrument is an ethanol subsidy/tax (i.e., = 0t ).  Then the 
optimal subsidy is given by:   
βψλσ σ
α ψ ψ
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞′
′ ′= − + +⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟′ ′ ′ ′− ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
* c o
f
D Sb
Q D
.   
 In addition: 
 (i) at the optimal subsidy, welfare is decreasing in both ethanol and gasoline consumption;  
 (ii) the constrained optimal subsidy may be positive even if, when both ethanol subsidies and fuel 
taxes are allowed, the net subsidy to ethanol is negative; 
 (iii) Even if there are no corn exports, a sufficient condition to guarantee that (positive) ethanol 
subsidies are welfare improving is λ ψ ψ′ ′ ′≤ −( )fD .  Provided λ < 1 , this condition is more 
likely to hold if the demand for fuel is not very price responsive. 
                                               
18 This expression is, of course, endogenous unless σ ′′ = 0  and ψ ′ = 0oS , where the latter occurs if 
there are no oil imports or if world oil price is exogenous. 
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In practice, of course, taxing fuel consumption takes place. In the United States the federal gasoline tax 
of $ 0.184/gallon, however, has not been changed since 1993. How such a tax rate ought to be adjusted 
in response to an optimal biofuels subsidy policy is the object of the following result.  
 
PROPOSITION 4.  Let the tax on fuel be exogenously determined, and let * ( )b t  denote the optimal 
ethanol subsidy.  Then: σ β ψ′ ′∀ < + ot S , an increase in the fuel tax raises welfare. 
 
The proof of Proposition 4 is reported in Appendix A2.  
 
5.2. Welfare when mandates are the only policy instrument 
We turn now to the welfare implications of mandates. From (36), and recalling (32), when the mandate 
is the only active policy instrument we have: 
 
(49)  ( ) ( )βσ λσψ α
∂⎧ ⎫ ⎧ ⎫
′ ′= − − − + − − +⎨ ⎬ ⎨ ⎬
′ ′∂ ⎩ ⎭⎩ ⎭
go c
f g f eM M
e e
xS DdW p p p p
Qdx x
 
 
From (20), and recalling the definitions of the terms ir  in (14), the impact of a binding ethanol mandate 
on gasoline sales is: 
 
(50) 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
ψ
ψ ψ
α
ψ
ψ
⎡ ⎤′ ′ ′⎛ ⎞− −⎛ ⎞
′ ′+ + − −⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟′⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
= − ⎢ ⎥
′ ′⎛ ⎞−⎢ ⎥
′ ′+ − − − − ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
2 1
1
f f
e g
fg
M
fe
f e g
f
D D
s s p p
xdx Q
Ddx
D s s p p
x
 
 
where ( )≡ ∈( ) 0,1Me fs x x  denotes the share of ethanol in fuel consumption.  Note that here the price 
of fuel is a weighted average of the gasoline and ethanol prices, = + −(1 )f e gp sp s p , implying  
( )− = − −( ) 1 ( )e f e gp p s p p  and − = −( ) ( )f g e gp p s p p . 
The “form” of the FOC for the optimal choice of the mandate is exactly the same as for the 
subsidy – the difference is in the term ∂ ∂( )g ex x , that is, in terms of the responsiveness of gasoline 
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usage to the (induced) change in ethanol usage.  In either case, since there is only one policy variable, 
one is forced to move in a one dimensional subset of the two dimensional welfare space ( , )g ex x .  As 
can be seen from comparing (46) and (50), when evaluated at the same point ( , )g ex x ,  
 
∂ ∂
< <
∂ ∂
0g g
e emandate subsidy
x x
x x
 
 
It follows that if the mandate and subsidy are set to yield the same ethanol output, the mandate will yield 
lower gasoline use (lower gp ) and hence lower aggregate fuel consumption (higher fp ).   
 Turning to the first order conditions, we have: 
 
PROPOSITION 5.  If the only feasible policy is an ethanol mandate, then a binding mandate will increase 
welfare if:   
( )
( )( )
ψ ψ αβλσ σ
α ψ ψ
=
⎛ ⎞′ ′ ′ ′+ −⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎜ ⎟′ ′= − + + >⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟′ ′ ′ ′+ − −⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
2
0
1
f e
fc o
M
e fp p
s D QD SdW
Qdx s D
 . 
  
The proof of this proposition follows from (49), using (50), and evaluating at the laissez-faire point 
= =f g ep p p .19 
 The non-equivalence of an ethanol subsidy and an ethanol mandate is further illustrated by the 
following result, which highlights the fact that subsidies and mandates are different policy instruments 
due to their differing impact on gasoline consumption.   
 
Lemma 5.   If, when only ethanol subsidies can be used, it would be optimal to tax ethanol (i.e,  
<* 0b ), it may still be optimal to have a binding mandate when mandates are the only feasible policy. 
 
                                               
19 Both here, and for the subsidy, we assume some ethanol would be produced in the laissez-faire 
equilibrium.  If not, a negative term reflecting the difference between the laissez-faire fuel price and the 
supply price of the first unit of ethanol would be added to the first expression inside the bracket:  i.e., it 
would be ( )α λσ′ ′− −( )cD Q v , where ( )≡ = −0e e fv p x p  represents what de Gorter and Just (2008) 
refer to as “water” in the mandate or subsidy. 
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This lemma follows from comparing the results of Proposition 3 and Proposition 5. Specifically, the 
expression in Proposition 5 coincides with that for *b  in Proposition 3 when = 0s . Thus, if it is optimal 
to tax ethanol ( <* 0b ) and = 0s , then a positive mandate would not increase welfare. But, the 
expression in Proposition 5 is monotonically increasing in s . Furthermore, at = 1s the expression in 
Proposition 5 must be positive, provided λ ≤ 1 .  Thus, provided some ethanol is used in the laissez-faire 
equilibrium, there are always parameter values such that <* 0b  and yet a positive ethanol mandate 
increases welfare.   
 
5.3. Comparing ethanol subsidies and ethanol mandates 
It is apparent that, in our setting, it would be better to be able to use two instruments, rather than only 
one of them. It is also of considerable interest to directly compare ethanol mandates and ethanol 
subsidies, but because of the second (or third) best nature of the problem, this is not easily done. The 
strategy that we use to derive a welfare ranking of the two instruments exploits the insight derived earlier 
in Proposition 1, that is, an ethanol mandate is equivalent to a combination of ethanol subsidy and fuel 
tax that is revenue-neutral. Hence, return to the case in which both fuel taxes and ethanol subsidies can 
be used. Tax revenue at the optimal solution is defined as = − = − −* * * * * *( )f e g eT t x b x t x b t x . Using the 
results of Proposition 2, collecting terms and converting to elasticities yields: 
 
(51) ( )σ λ
ε ε
⎧ ⎫⎪ ⎪
′= ⋅ + + −⎨ ⎬⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
* o o c c
g e
g c
p S p D
T x x  
 
where, as earlier, εg  is the elasticity of gasoline supply and εc  is the elasticity of the residual supply 
curve of corn to the ethanol industry. This expression is very likely to be positive for a variety of 
reasons.  Even if there were no externalities (i.e., σ ′ = 0 ), the value of oil imports o op S  exceeds the 
value of corn exports c cp D , and the elasticity of the residual supply curve for corn is most likely larger 
than the elasticity of supply of gasoline.  The presence of the externality (i.e., σ ′ > 0 ), of course, only 
reinforces the likelihood that optimal net tax revenues are positive.   
 
Assumption 3.   Assuming both ethanol subsidies and fuel taxes can be used, net tax revenue at the 
optimal solution is positive. 
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Before comparing ethanol subsidies with ethanol mandates, it is useful to consider iso-tax 
revenue curves in gasoline-ethanol space. Consider output vectors ( , )g ex x , and the supporting taxes 
and subsidies ( , )g et x x  and ( , )g eb x x .  Let T  denote the tax revenue associated with ( , )g ex x : 
 
(52) ( ) ( ) ( )≡ + −, ,g e g e g e eT t x x x x b x x x  
 
Totally differentiating (52), and using (13) and (23), implies:  
 
(53)  ( )= − +1 g edT Hdx KdxN  
 
Hence, the iso-tax revenue condition = 0dT  yields = − < 0g edx dx K H  (recall that, under the assumed 
stability condition, > 0K  and > 0H ). That is, the iso-tax revenue curves are negatively sloped in the 
( , )g ex x  space.  Furthermore, equation (53) makes it clear that iso-tax revenue curves corresponding to 
higher net tax revenue are closer to the origin – i.e., entail lower ethanol usage, given gasoline usage.  To 
summarize the foregoing: 
 
Lemma 6.  Let  ( ) { }≡ − ≤, , ( , ) ( , ) ( , )g e i g e g e f g e e iS x x T x x t x x x b x x x T  denote the set of points that 
yield at most a given tax revenue iT . If >1 0 ,T T  then ( ) ( )⊂0 1, , , ,g e g eS x x T S x x T . 
 
Figure 2 illustrates these iso-tax revenue curves. The properties of these iso-tax revenue curves, in 
conjunction with Assumption 3, allow us to rank, according to the welfare criterion, ethanol mandates 
and ethanol subsidies.  Specifically: 
 
PROPOSITION 6.  Let >* 0T  denote the net tax revenue corresponding to the optimal policy when both 
fuel taxes and ethanol subsidies may be used. Then 
 (i) Ethanol mandates yield higher welfare than an ethanol subsidy policy.   
 (ii) If both fuel taxes and ethanol subsidies can be used, but there is an upper bound, 0T , on net 
revenue that is permitted to be raised by the policy combination, then, provided < *0T T , 
increasing the upper bound raises welfare.   
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The proof of this proposition, detailed in Appendix A3, relies on comparing the maximized value of the 
welfare function, by choosing the instrument ( , )b t , under the constraint the policy yield (no more than) 
a given tax revenue, say 0ˆ ( )W T . In view of Lemma 6, constraining the tax revenue to be zero (as with 
the mandate) lowers welfare, relative to the second best optimum (which by assumption yields >* 0T ). 
But the tax revenue sT  of a subsidy-only policy is negative, and hence, as shown in Appendix A3, it 
follows that ( )< < *ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) 0 ( )sW T W W T .  Furthermore, because the constrained optimum problem allows 
both taxes and subsidies, whereas the subsidy-only problem requires = 0t , it follows that 
( )
=
≤
0
ˆ ˆ( )s st
W T W T . That is, the solution for the subsidy-only problem must be weakly inferior (and 
almost surely is strictly inferior) to the constrained optimum using both instruments, but having the 
same net tax revenue outlay. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The search for renewable and cleaner energy sources that reduce pollution and reliance on potentially 
unstable foreign sources of nonrenewable energy is a stated policy goal of many large countries 
worldwide, including the United States.  Government intervention to reduce reliance on polluting, non-
renewable energy sources will have significant economic consequences in the years to come and it is 
important that these consequences be well understood. While there are several possible sources of 
renewable energy, we have focused in this paper on biofuels (which for the United States essentially 
means corn-based ethanol), though in principle the same techniques could be used to study the impact 
of policies on other forms of renewable energy. 
We reach several noteworthy and novel conclusions.  First, we show that ethanol mandates are 
equivalent to a policy of taxing fuel and subsidizing ethanol (i.e., providing tax credits to ethanol 
blenders). Thus the equivalence between price and quantity tools that holds when the quantity restricts 
the unfettered market outcome (i.e, an import restriction or a pollution restriction) does not hold here.  
The reason for the nonequivalence is because the mandates are imposed upon multi-product (or multi-
input) firms and thus change the mix of products the firm produces (or uses).  Illustrations of such 
mandates include the biofuels policy discussed in this paper, but also apply to other situations, such as 
mandates that require electric power firms to generate a certain fraction of their power from renewable 
sources, or the CAFE (Corporate Average Fuel Economy) regulations to improve vehicles’ average fuel 
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economy. Because the binding mandates (virtually by definition) raise firms’ costs, zero-profit 
competitive equilibrium implies that part of the cost increases are shifted on to other products, and thus 
the mandate acts not just as a subsidy to the use of ethanol (the mandated product) but also as a tax on 
the other activity carried out by firms.   
We also found that neither ethanol subsidies nor ethanol mandates alone can achieve multiple 
policy goals, and that in our framework coupling either policy with a fuel tax would be beneficial. This 
conclusion, in turn, allows us to derive a novel welfare ranking of the two instruments (biofuels subsidy 
or mandate) in isolation.  Specifically, our analysis shows that an ethanol mandate is fully equivalent to a 
combination of fuel taxes and ethanol subsidies that revenue neutral. As discussed in the paper, it then 
follows that the use of a production/consumption mandate for ethanol actually leads to higher welfare 
than the use of ethanol subsidies.   
There is broad scope for expanding the issues studied here.  For one, the welfare interaction 
between the domestic economy and the rest of the world was captured just through world prices, but 
the model could readily be extended to recognize that domestic policy affects foreign greenhouse gas 
emissions. This “leakage” problem, as for example the case of indirect land use changes discussed in the 
introduction, clearly impacts domestic welfare. Moreover, there are significant dynamic issues that arise 
in this context and that we have not addressed explicitly in the model. Strategic considerations and 
international cooperation to address what is, ultimately, the global externality issue connected with 
climate change, are also outside the scope of the current paper. All that is the object of ongoing  
research projects of many researchers, and will no doubt define a good portion of the research agenda in 
this area for years to come.  
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Appendix A1.  Notation summary 
 
ox =  quantity of oil 
gx =  quantity of unblended gasoline 
v
ex =  quantity of ethanol (in volume units) 
ex =  quantity of ethanol (in gasoline energy-equivalent units) 
fx =  quantity of total “fuel” (gasoline and ethanol-blended gasoline) 
cx = quantity of corn used in ethanol production 
gz =  other variable inputs used in the production of gasoline 
ez = other variable inputs used in the production of ethanol 
op =  price of oil 
gp = price of unblended gasoline 
ep =  price of (gasoline energy-equivalent) ethanol  
fp =  price of total fuel 
cp =  price of corn 
gw =  price of other inputs used in the production of gasoline 
ew =  price of other inputs used in the production of ethanol 
vb =  unit ethanol blending subsidy (at the moment ≅ 0.51vb  $/gal.) 
b=  unit ethanol blending subsidy when ethanol is measured in gasoline energy-equivalent units  
(.)C = aggregate cost function for domestic corn production 
Ω(.)= aggregate cost function for domestic oil production 
(.)D  =  direct demand for fuel 
(.)oS  =  foreign supply of oil to the U.S. market 
(.)oS  =  domestic supply of oil 
ψ ⋅( )  =  derived supply of unblended gasoline 
⋅( )Q  =  derived supply of corn to the ethanol industry 
εg = elasticity of the derived supply of gasoline 
εc = elasticity of the (residual) supply of corn to the ethanol industry 
ε =e  elasticity of the derived supply of ethanol 
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Appendix A2. Proof of Proposition 4 
Denote ( ) ( ) ( )( )≡, , , ,g eV b t W x b t x b t   and let ( )*b t  be the optimal subsidy. From earlier, ( )*b t  is 
determined from: 
{ }η⎛ ⎞∂⎛ ⎞∂ ∂⎜ ⎟= + = + =⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟∂ ∂ ∂⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ 0;
ge e
b e g e g
xx x
V W W W W
b b b
   
where ( )η ∈ −0, 1  is as defined in (46).  By the envelope theorem, ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂= + =∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
*dV V V b V
dt t b t t
, thus: 
{ }δ⎛ ⎞∂ ∂⎛ ⎞∂∂ ⎜ ⎟= + = +⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
g ge
e g e g
x xxV W W W W
t t t t
 
where δ
⎛ ⎞ ∂⎛ ⎞∂ ∂
≡ > >⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟∂ ∂ ∂⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
0 ge
g
xx t
x t t
. Note that η  is the slope, g edx dx , in gasoline-ethanol space, of the 
one dimensional locus generated by changing the subsidy, holding the tax rate constant, while δ −1  is the 
slope, g edx dx , in gasoline-ethanol space, of the one dimensional locus generated by changing the tax 
rate, holding the subsidy rate constant. As discussed in the text, if the condition σ β ψ′ ′< + *( )ot S  holds 
then < 0gW . Because the FOC requires η+ = 0e gW W , then < 0eW  must hold as well. Recalling that 
∂ ∂ < 0gx t  and δ > 0 , it follows that  
{ }δ∂⎛ ⎞= + >⎜ ⎟∂⎝ ⎠ 0
g
e g
xdV W W
dt t
 .  QED 
 
Appendix A3.  Proof of Proposition 6 
Consider the functions ( ),gx b t  and ( ),ex b t  as defined earlier, and assume the objective is to maximize 
welfare, subject to the constraint ( ) ( )⎡ ⎤− ≤⎣ ⎦ 0, ,f etx t b bx t b T , using the instruments { },b t :  
( ) ( )( ) − ≤ 0, ; , . . ;
,
g e f eMax W x b t x b t s t tx bx T
b t
   
where 0T  is an exogenous scalar. The Lagrangean function for this problem is: 
( ) ( )( ) ( )τ= + + −0, ; ,g e e fL W x b t x b t T bx tx    
We do not restrict t or b to be non-negative.  Since the constraint is an inequality constraint, τ ≥ 0 . 
Optimizing yields these first order conditions: 
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( )
( )
( )τ τ
η τ η
δ τ δ δ
τ τ
−
−
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1
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1 0
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0; 0; 0
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e g
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L W W b t x
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where: ( )η ∈ −0, 1  and δ > 0  were defined earlier. Call the solution to this constrained optimization 
problem ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )τ0 0 0 0 0, , , ,c c c c cg et T b T x T x T T , with optimized value 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )τ = ≡0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0ˆ, , , , ,c c c c c c cg e g eL t T b T x T x T T W x T x T W T . 
Let ( )* * * *, , ,g eb t x x refer to the (unconstrained) second-best solution described in Proposition 2, and 
= −
* * * * *
f eT t x b x .  If ≥ *0T T , the constraint on net tax revenue will not bind, so τ =
* 0  and hence the 
second best solution ( )* *,b t  applies.  Call the welfare level for this case ( )= ∀ ≥* * *ˆW W T T T .   
Next, suppose >* 0T , and consider the constrained optimization problem for < *0T T .  Then, in 
this domain:  ( ) ( )τ′ = >*0 0ˆ 0,W T T  since the constraint binds.  As shown earlier, the ethanol mandate is 
equivalent to a {tax, subsidy} policy with a tax revenue constraint =0 0T ;  that is, 
( ) ( ){ } { }
=
=
0
0 0 0
, ,c c m mg e g eT
x T x T x x   (i.e., the mandate solution).  Welfare with the mandate is less than that 
which obtains when both taxes and subsidies can be independently used, provided ≠* 0T .  
Next, let ≡ − < 0s ss eT b x  denote net tax revenues (which are negative) under the constrained 
optimal ethanol subsidy when taxes are not feasible.  Since < < *0sT T , it follows that constrained 
welfare, using both fuel taxes and subsidies, when net tax revenue is sT  must be less then that under a 
mandate; i.e., ( ) ( ) ( )< < *ˆ ˆ ˆ0sW T W W T .  Finally, note that ( ) ( )= ≤ ˆ0, s sW t b W T , because the constrained 
optimum problem allows both taxes and subsidies, whereas the subsidy only problem requires = 0t . 
That is, the solution for the subsidy only problem is in the domain for the constrained revenue problem, 
and hence the subsidy only problem must be weakly inferior (and almost surely is strictly inferior) to the 
constrained optimum using both instruments, but having the same net tax revenue outlay.    QED 
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Table 1:  Comparative static effects of fuel taxes and ethanol subsidies 
  
Impact of taxes and subsidies on price Impact of taxes and subsidies on quantities 
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Figure 1. Welfare in ethanol-gasoline space 
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Figure 2.  Iso-tax Revenue Curves 
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